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Abstract
Speculative attacks are often modeled as decreases in money demand before currency crises.
I discuss how, in models with microfoundations, within-period timing affects whether attacks
arise in equilibrium. “Cash-when-I’m-done” timing always generates attacks, but is
controversial because it assumes that end-of-period money balances buy current
consumption. Cash-in-advance timing, theoretically more appealing, generates attacks only
under restrictive assumptions. These issues arise when money is introduced via liquidity
constraints, the utility function, or a transactions technology. Modeling attacks via reductions
in demand for domestic bonds, instead of reductions in money demand, helps avoid these
issues, and may be more realistic.
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper discusses implications of within-period timing assumptions in models of currency crises. In 
particular,  the  choice  of  which  money  balances  are  available  for  transactions  has  important 
consequences for a model’s ability to generate speculative attacks.   
In the seminal papers of Krugman (1979), and Flood and Garber (1979), a speculative attack is 
modeled as a decline in demand for real balances. These early models assume that real money demand is 
a  decreasing  function  of  expected  inflation.  An  instant  before  a  currency  peg  collapses,  expected 
inflation increases and money demand falls. The speculative attack is the act of consumers exchanging 
excess domestic currency for foreign reserves. In models with microfoundations, this pre-crisis drop in 
money demand has to be utility-maximizing. In a simple, perfect-foresight environment, I analyze the 
optimal response of consumers to a crisis under alternative timing setups. Implications of within-period 
timing are often not discussed, because currency crisis papers featuring microfoundations frequently 
model time as a continuous variable, and thus omit these details.
1 Nevertheless, timing has important 
implications regardless of whether money is introduced via liquidity constraints, in the utility function, 
or as input in a transactions technology.
2  
A timing setup that is relatively common, not only in crisis models such as Obstfeld (1986) and 
Burnside et al. (2001), but also in other areas of macroeconomics, is one that Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(2001)  label  “cash-when-I’m-done”  (CWID)  timing.  This  timing  assumes  that  money  available  for 
transactions  is  end-of-period  money,  i.e.  money  held  after  receiving  transfers,  selling  endowments, 
purchasing consumption, and dividing the remaining wealth between money and bonds. Under CWID 
timing, the result that consumers find it optimal to launch an attack by reducing money holdings is 
robust to many different specifications of utility. Nevertheless, as Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) point out, 
CWID is unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view, as it supposes that consumption expenditures 
are restricted, not by the money held as the consumer enters those transactions, but instead by the money 
held after these transactions in the goods market, and after even more transactions in an asset market.   
An obvious candidate for an alternative timing that is immune to this critique is cash-in-advance 
(CIA) timing, under  which only money accumulated in previous periods can help in current-period 
transactions (see, among many others Clower (1967), Lucas (1980), and Svensson (1985)). But this 
theoretically more appealing timing does not generate speculative attacks with the same generality as 
CWID. Restrictive assumptions on utility are required for consumers to find it optimal to exchange 
domestic  money  for  reserves  in  the  last  pre-crisis  period.  For  instance,  in  models  with  liquidity 
constraints  and  CES  utility,  consumers  reduce  domestic  money  demand  only  if  the  intertemporal 
elasticity  of  substitution  for  consumption  is  above  one.  In  the  unit-elasticity,  i.e.  logarithmic  case, 
consumers  keep  their  nominal  money  holdings  unchanged,  even  though  the  nominal  interest  rate 
increases. And if the intertemporal elasticity is below unity, consumers actually increase their money 
holdings.  The  assumption  of  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  above  unity  is  by  no  means 
innocuous, since empirical estimates of this number usually hover around zero (see, for example, Hall 
(1988)) or around one (Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996)).  
                                                 
1 Examples of continuous-time models featuring microfoundations for money include Calvo (1987), Burnside, Eichenbaum 
and Rebelo (2001), and Lahiri and Végh (2003). Obstfeld (1986) analyzes a model both in discrete time, and in continuous 
time. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) analyze a continuous-time model, but, in a footone, show the discrete-time 
model that corresponds to it when taking the limit as period length goes to zero. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2004) 
analyze a discrete-time model, but they assume that in the crisis period, there is rationing in the foreign exchange market. 
Consumers demand unbounded amounts of reserves, but the central bank only gives them an exogenously limited quantity. 
This makes it difficult to compare results regarding the attack with models in which prices clear the currency market.   
2 I use the term liquidity constraints instead of cash-in-advance constraints to avoid confusion, since I use cash-in-advance as 
the name of a within-period timing structure.   2 
The reason for the difference in results becomes evident once we consider the consumer’s trade-
off when choosing money holdings in the presence of liquidity constraints. Under both timings, money 
provides liquidity services but has an opportunity cost in the form of forgone nominal interest. Thus, 
under both timings the inflation and nominal interest rate increase that comes with the crisis causes a 
decline in post-crisis consumption, and thus in post-crisis real balances. However, with CIA timing, this 
does not necessarily imply that nominal money holdings fall in the last pre-crisis period, because the 
increase in inflation already erodes the real value of the money held between periods. Hence, under CIA 
timing, reducing nominal money holdings, i.e. launching a speculative attack, is optimal only if the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is above one, in which case the drop in desired consumption 
outweighs the effect of inflation. Under CWID money held between the current period and the next 
provides  liquidity  in  the  current  period.  Thus,  in  the  last  pre-crisis  period,  the  opportunity  cost  of 
holding money goes up, but the price of goods bought with that money remains fixed. Hence, for any 
positive  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution,  consumption  and  nominal  money  holdings  fall.  A 
similar argument applies to models with money in the utility function (MIUF). With CIA timing higher 
nominal interest rates reduce real money demand, but since money is held for one period before yielding 
utility, higher inflation already implies lower real balances even if nominal balances are held constant. 
Wanting real balances to fall even more is only optimal under certain conditions regarding the degree to 
which utility is concave with respect to real balances. A very similar argument applies when money is an 
input in a transactions technology. CWID guarantees attacks as long the reductions in transaction costs 
are a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of real balances, while CIA generates attacks only 
if the function linking real balances to transaction costs satisfies particular curvature requirements.    
In addition to these theoretical issues, there are empirical reasons to focus on variables other than 
money as a source of attacks. In actual crises, it is a stylized fact that before an exchange rate collapses, 
reserves fall significantly. But this is usually not accompanied by a decline in money, as exemplified by 
Mexico (1994), Korea (1997/98), Brazil (1999), and many others. It appears, thus, that the pre-crisis fall 
in reserves is due to private agents reducing the fraction of savings that they invest in domestic-currency 
denominated assets other than money, such as bonds. Thus, speculative attacks could be modeled by 
highlighting the fact that, for given amounts of debt sold by the government, when expected inflation 
increases, revenue falls.
3 This forces the government to sell reserves in order to pay for expenditures, 
provided  that  neither  taxes  nor  expenditures  are  adjusted,  which  in  turn  is  not  an  unreasonable 
assumption  since  in  reality  expectations  in  financial  markets  can  change  very  quickly  while  fiscal 
variables change only infrequently. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a basic model with liquidity 
constraints and discrete time, and discusses its equivalent continuous-time version. Section 3 proves the 
main results regarding CWID and CIA timing. Section 4 shows that similar results hold with MIUF and 
money in a transactions technology. Section 5 proposes reductions in revenue from government bond 
auctions as a source of attacks and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model in Discrete Time and in Continuous Time 
 
The basic model features a deterministic, discrete-time environment in which periods are denoted by 
0,1, t = …. The home country is a small open economy that produces and consumes only one good. This 
good sells at home for  t p  units of domestic currency and in the rest of the world for  , w t p  units of 
foreign currency. The (domestic for foreign) nominal exchange rate is given by  . t s  PPP holds  
                                                 
3 Similar arguments highlighting the role of nominal interest rates and domestic bonds have been made, for example, by 
Obstfeld (1994). In that model, however, consumer behavior was not derived from microfoundations.   3 
,                      for all  0,                      t t w t p s p t = ≥        (1) 
and  , 1 w t p =  at all times, so that  t p  and  t s  always coincide. The representative household has a constant 
endowment  y  and preferences over consumption sequences  0 { } t t c ≥  represented by the utility function 








= ∑                        0 1.  β < <     (2) 
The period-utility function  u  satisfies usual strict monotonicity, strict concavity and Inada conditions. 
There are two assets. One of them is a foreign bond  t b  with constant gross real return R. As is usual in 
the currency crisis literature,  1 Rβ =  is assumed. The other asset is domestic money, which pays no 
interest. The representative household starts period  t with  1 t M −  units of domestic money  and with 
foreign bond holdings worth  1 t b −  units of time-t consumption. Over the course of period t, households 
harvest and sell their endowment  y , receive a nominal lump-sum transfer  t τ  (or pay a tax if  t τ  is 
negative), and purchase  t c  units of the consumption good. Finally, the household chooses how much 
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Under CWID timing, consumption cannot exceed end-of-period real balances: 







≤               (4) 
This assumption is problematic, since it allows cash earned selling the current-period endowment to buy 
consumption in the same period. According to Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) “It is very difficult to justify 
CWID timing on theoretical grounds … [This timing] implies that … what aids in current transactions is 
the money I leave the supermarket with, not the money I entered the market with.” Furthermore, they 
observe  that  “…  [CWID  timing]  violates  Clower’s  dictum  that  ‘money  buys  goods  and  goods  buy 
money, but goods do not buy goods’”. 
An obvious way to avoid the Clower-Carlstrom-Fuerst critique is simply to assume cash-in-
advance (CIA) timing, changing the liquidity constraint in order to let  1 t M −  restrict current consumption: 
    







− ≤              (5) 
It continuous-time models, it is generally impossible to see whether CIA or CWID timing is assumed. At 
times in which asset holdings do not jump discretely, the continuous-time version of (3) is given by
4  
     ( 1) ,     
t
t t t t t t
t
m m y c R b b
p
τ
π + ≤ + − + − − ￿ ￿         (6) 
                                                 
4 To see this, note that (3) is a special case for  1 t ∆ =  of  
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Dividing both sides by  t ∆  and letting  t ∆  approach zero yields (6) . Intermediate steps on the left are: 
0 0 0
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￿    4 
where  / , t t t m M p =   / t t t p p π = ￿  is the inflation rate, and a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. 
When asset holdings jump,  t m ￿  and  t b ￿  do not exist, and instead of (6), we have  . t t m b ∆ = −∆  Liquidity 
constraints (4) and (5) become  t t c m ≤  when  t m ￿  and  t b ￿  exist, and when they do not, the CWID liquidity 
constraint (4) is  t t c m ≤  and the CIA liquidity constraint (5) is  0 (lim )/ . t t t t t c M p ∆ → −∆ ≤  While at first this 
difference appears to be enough to distinguish CWID from CIA, this is not the case. If start- and end-of-
period assets are simply relabeled  ( , ) t t M b  and  1 1 ( , ), t t M b + +  instead of  1 1 ( , ) t t M b − −  and  ( , ), t t M b then, 
taking limits leaves budget constraints (6) and  t t m b ∆ = −∆  unchanged, but liquidity constraints become, 
under  CIA  t t c m ≤   at  all  times,  and  under  CWID  t t c m ≤   when  t m ￿   and  t b ￿   exist,  and 
0 (lim )/ t t t t t c M p ∆ → +∆ ≤   otherwise.  Thus,  given  a  constraint  (6)  (with  t t m b ∆ = −∆   for  discontinuous 
times) and liquidity constraints  t t c m ≤ , it is impossible to tell whether CIA or CWID is assumed.    
 
3.  Currency Crisis and Speculative Attack 
 
The role of within-period timing in generating attacks can be explored in a very simple perfect-foresight 
environment. For consumers, all that is relevant is that the exchange rate  t s , and thus  , t p  stay fixed 
until time  , T  and increase at time  1. T +  For simplicity’s sake, I will follow the usual assumption that 
from time  1 T +  onward  t s  and  t p  grow at the constant rate  0: π >  
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…
  (7) 
 
Of course, this implies that the nominal interest rate, defined as  1 / 1, t t t i Rp p + ≡ −  equals  1 R−  for t from 
zero to  1 T −  and then jumps to  (1 ) 1 R π + −  from period T onwards.  
A speculative attack in this economy is defined as a drop in nominal money demand at time  , T  
1 . T T M M − −  In other words, an attack occurs if the fall in reserves exceeds  / . T T p τ  In continuous time, 
t τ  is infinitesimal and the decline in money demand coincides with the reserves lost. But in discrete time 
one should be careful to distinguish the gradual loss of reserves that happens if transfers are positive up 
to time T (every period, consumers exchange those transfers for reserves as soon as they receive them) 
from the loss of reserves due to consumers anticipating the collapse of the fixed exchange rate. Having 
clarified this, I next proceed to state and prove the paper’s main results in propositions 1 and 2.  
 
 
Proposition 1 In models with liquidity constraints, under CIA timing, consumers reduce nominal money 
holdings at time T only under restrictive assumptions regarding utility. For 
1 ( ) ( 1)/(1 ) t t u c c
σ σ
− = − −  
nominal money holdings fall if  1, σ <  stay constant if  1 σ =  and increase if  1 σ > . 
Proof  Given initial asset holdings  1 b−  and  1 0 M− > , and prices  1/ R β =  and  0 { } t t p ≥  given by (7), the 
consumer chooses  0 { , , } t t t t c b M ≥  to maximize (2) subject to (3), (5), and  , 0 t b B t ≥ − ∀ ≥ , where B rules 
out Ponzi schemes but otherwise does not bind in equilibrium. Taking first order conditions with respect 
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   5 
Given (7), the right-hand side of (8) is one if t T ≠  and (1 ) π +  if  . t T =  It follows that one consumption 
level  T c  is optimal for all  {1, , } t T ∈ …  ( 0 c  may be different since  1 M−  is not chosen) and  1 T c +  is optimal 
for all  1. t T ≥ +  Strict concavity of u  implies  1 . T T c c + <  But  1 T T M M − <  holds only if the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution is high enough to make consumption fall by more than inflation rises. In the 
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Setting  , t T =  using (5) with equality to eliminate  T c  and  1 T c +  and rearranging terms yields the desired 
link between the elasticity of substitution 1/σ  and money holdings  
1
1
1             (1 ) .  Q.E.D.                                       T T M M σ π
−
− = +  (10) 
 
Proposition 2 With CWID timing, consumers find it optimal to launch a speculative attack at time T for 
any u  that is strictly increasing and strictly concave.  
 
Proof Everything is the same as in the proof of proposition 1, but liquidity constraints are given by (4) 
instead of (5). Again, taking first order conditions with respect to  , t c , t b and  , t M  and combining them 





















                       (11) 
Since  1, T T i i − >   strict  concavity  of  u implies  that  consumption  falls  between  periods  1 T −   and  . T  
Because in both periods the price is still fixed, it follows that  1. T T M M − <  Q.E.D. 
 
4.  Robustness: Money in the Utility Function and Money in a Transactions Technology 
 
The main message of propositions 1 and 2, namely that CWID timing always generates attacks, while 
CIA timing requires restrictive assumptions, also applies in MIUF models and in models where, as in 
Lahiri and Végh (2003), money is an input in a transactions technology.  
In the MIUF case, with separable utility from real balances, the utility function is    
[ ]
0




u c M p β ϖ
∞
=
+ ∑   (12) 
 
in the CWID case, with  1 t M −  replacing  t M  in the CIA case. The function ϖ  is assumed to satisfy strict 
monotonicity, strict concavity and Inada conditions. Once more, given  1 b−  and  1 0 M− > , and prices 
1/ R β =  and  0 { } t t p ≥  given by (7) the consumer chooses  0 { , , } t t t t c b M ≥  to maximize (12) subject to (3) 
and  , 0 t b B t ≥ − ∀ ≥ . (Of course (12) is modified in the CIA case.) First-order conditions (see appendix 
B) imply constant consumption  t c c =  for all  0 t ≥ . Money demand, in the CIA case, is determined by   












′ ′ =  
 
  (13) 
and in the CWID case by   6 










′ ′ =   +  
.  (14) 
At  time  t T =   the  nominal  interest  rate  T i   increases,  i.e.  1. T T i i − >   Equation  (13)  implies  that 
1 1 ( / ) ( / ) T T T T M p M p ϖ ϖ + − ′ ′ > , and strict concavity of ϖ  implies  1 1 / / (1 ) T T T T M M p p π − + < = + . In the 
CIA case, this is all that can be established without further assumptions on how sensitive  ϖ′ is to 
changes  in  its  argument.  In  the  CWID  case  (14)  unambiguously  implies  that,  since  1 T T p p − =   and 
1, T T i i − >  for any strictly concave  , ϖ   1. T T M M − <   
When money is an input in a transactions technology, every period consumers pay a transaction 
cost φ  which is decreasing in  / t t M p  and in  / . t t H p   t H  is a domestic asset that can be thought of as, 
for example, a money market account, in that it provides more liquidity than the foreign bond, but less 
than money, and it earns nominal interest at the rate  (0, ).
g
t t i i ∈  For clarity of exposition, I will focus on 
the case in which the government does not increase 
g
t i  when  t i  increases, and just set 
g g
t i i =  for all 
0. t ≥  The transaction cost, in the case of CIA timing, is given by  
 
                           1 1 1 1 ( / , / ) ( / ) ( / ), t t t t t t t t H p M p K H p w M p φ ν − − − − = − −                  (15) 
 
where  0 K > , and ν  and w satisfy Inada conditions, are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and are 
such that φ  is always positive. In this setting, the budget constraint is given by  
  
1 1 1 1
1 , .
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t t t t t t t t
t t g
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M b H M H H M
b y c
p R i p p p p p p
τ
φ
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 
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    (16) 
 
Under CWID timing,  φ  is a function of  / t t H p  and  / t t M p  instead of  1 / t t H p −  and  1 / . t t M p −  This 
model turns out to be very similar to the MIUF model. With CIA timing, it is easy to verify that the 
choice of  t H  that maximizes (2) subject to (16) has to satisfy  
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                 (17) 
As in the MIUF case, (7) and (17) imply that  1 T T H H − <  only if v′ is relatively insensitive to changes in 
1 / . t t H p +  Under CWID, in contrast, the optimal  t H  is dictated by  
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,  (18) 
which implies that  t H  must fall at t T =  since v is strictly concave. The analysis of whether  t M  falls at 
t T =  is analogous, just modifying (17) and (18) by setting  0
g i =  and using w instead of  . v   
 
5.  Attacks as Reductions in Domestic-Currency Denominated Savings 
 
The analysis so far suggests that there may be theoretical difficulties in modeling speculative attacks as 
drops in money demand. CWID timing is, per se, controversial, while CIA timing requires assumptions 
on  preferences  or  technology  that  may  be  difficult  to  support  with  evidence.  In  addition  to  these 
theoretical issues, modeling speculative attacks as declines in money demand is also subject to empirical 
challenges. The large drop in reserves that happens in the days, or weeks, prior to currency crises, does 
not, in general, coincide with reductions in the money supply. This indicates that the drop in reserves   7 
may be due to the private sector reducing the amount of resources they invest in assets such as domestic-
currency denominated bonds. This idea can be modeled, and has been modeled, in many ways, see for 
instance Obstfeld (1994), and in the context of debt crises, Cole and Kehoe (2000). In the simple model 
studied in this paper, this idea can be incorporated by adding domestic debt  , t D  which, by no-arbitrage 
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Obviously, in period  t T =  the increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the real resources that 
consumers need to buy the domestic debt. If consumers do not increase money demand in this last pre-
crisis  period,  the  remaining  resources  are  invested  in  foreign  bonds.  The  decline  in  reserves  also 
becomes evident once we examine the government’s budget constraint  
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where  t f  denotes foreign reserves, and  t g  real government purchases. If we suppose, for instance, that 
the government maintains the debt constant over time, the decrease in the price at which consumers buy 
the debt reduces government revenues. If  t g  and  t τ  are not adjusted, reserves fall.
5  
Finally, focusing on bonds instead of money demand has at least two more advantages. First, by 
allowing bonds to have maturities longer than one period, the decline in reserves prior to crises can be 
made gradual instead of sudden. This feature seems desirable since in reality speculative pressure often 
accrues over several weeks or months. Second, the price consumers are willing to pay for government 
bonds may also reflect (in addition to expectations of devaluation) a probability of default, which is 
useful since currency collapses and fears of default occur simultaneously in many financial crises.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Speculative attacks in which private agents acquire large amounts of reserves from central banks are a 
central feature of currency crises. In fact, in second-generation models, there are instances in which 
crises would never happen if private agents did not launch a speculative attack against the currency. 
Starting  with  Krugman  (1979)  and  Flood  and  Garber  (1984),  attacks  have  often  been  modeled  as 
decreases  in  money  demand.  This  paper  argues  that  in  models  with  microfoundations  for  money, 
consumers do not always find it optimal to reduce their holdings of domestic currency in the last period 
before a crisis. In the environment studied in this paper, controversial assumptions regarding either 
within-period  timing  or  consumer  preferences  are  needed  to  guarantee  the  optimality  of  these 
speculative attacks. Since, in addition to these theoretical issues, there are many actual crises in which 
money did not fall, it may be preferable to focus on the demand for domestic-currency denoinated 
bonds, rather than money, as a source of attacks. 
 
                                                 
5 Of course, this need not hold if government purchases, transfers, or the amount of debt auctioned are adjusted. But, since 
fiscal policy can always be adjusted so that crises never happen, all currency crisis models must implicitly or explicitly 
assume that these adjustments are not made.    8 
Appendix A – Intermediate Steps in the Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 
 
In the proof of proposition 1, letting  t λ  and  t ξ  denote Lagrange multipliers associated with (3) and (4), 
respectively, first order necessary conditions with respect to  , t c , t b and  , t M  are: 
( )
t
t t t u c β λ ξ ′ = +                                                                  (A1) 








t t t p p p
λ λ ξ + +
+ +
= + .                 (A3) 
Solving for  t λ  in (A3) and substituting the result into (A2) yields 
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From here, solving for  1 t ξ +  and recalling that  ( ) 1 / 1 t t t i Rp p + ≡ − , we obtain 
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1 1 1 1 .
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= − =  
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                     (A4) 
Since t is arbitrary, it is also true that  1 t t t i ξ λ − = . Combining with (A1), we see that 
( ) 1 (1 )
t
t t t u c i β λ − ′ = + .          (A5) 
Finally, dividing the  1 t + -analog of (A5) by (A5), using (A2) and  1 Rβ = , (8) obtains. 
In the proof of proposition 2, first-order onditions with respect to  t c  and  t b  are still (A1) and 
(A2) but with respect to  t M  we have   
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+
= + .                     (A6) 
Solving for  t ξ  yields 







ξ λ λ +
+
= − .     
Substituting this into (A1) and using (A2) to eliminate  1 t λ +  we obtain 
                              ( )
1
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                 (A7) 
From here, (11) is derived following steps analogous to those in the proof of proposition 1. 
 
Appendix B – First-Order Conditions in the MIUF case 
 
The first order condition with respect to consumption is simply given by  
  ( )
t
t t u c β λ ′ =    (B1) 
Combining this with (A2) and using the fact that  1 Rβ = ,  t c c =  for all  0 t ≥  follows. 
Under CIA timing, the first order condition with respect to  t M  is  
                                                        
1 1 1
1 1









= +                                                          (B2)   9 
Multiplying by  1, t p +  using (A2) and (B1), and solving for  1 ( / ) t t M p ϖ + ′  yields (13). 
In the CWID case, the first order condition with respect to  t M  is  
                                                          
1
1









= +                                                            (B3) 
Multiplying by  t p , using (A2) to eliminate  1 t λ + , using (B1) to eliminate  t λ , solving for  ( / ) t t M p ϖ′  and 
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